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A B S T R A C T
The purpose of this study is to determine the impact of unofﬁcial out-of-pocket payments on satisfaction
with education in the countries of the former Soviet Union andMongolia. Linear IV indicates that out-of-
pocket payments weaken satisfaction by a factor of 0.98, while biprobit indicates that out-of-pocket
payments lessen satisfaction by 0.29 percentage points. At the same time, the interaction model
demonstrates that the negative impact of paying unofﬁcial out-of-pocket payments declines as quality of
education improves. As quality of education deteriorates, the negative impact of paying unofﬁcial out-of-
pocket payments grows considerably.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In public service delivery, including public education, the
feedback of citizens is a key indicator with respect to the quality
and efﬁciency of services delivered (Babajanian, 2015; Deichmann
and Lall, 2007; Poister and Henry, 1994). However, the purpose of
feedback is not only to evaluate the performance of service
providers, but also to ensure that providers become user-oriented
(Diagne et al., 2012; Ravindra, 2004). In addition, holding
government accountable through feedback is increasingly recog-
nized as a vital way to enhance service delivery, build the capacity
of civil society, foster the culture of transparency in governance,
and accomplish the long-term objective of socio-economic
development (McNeil et al., 2009). Finally, the provision of
feedback also affords citizens valuable opportunities through
which to inﬂuence the decisions that affect their lives, and
becomes a promising mechanism through which to increase their
empowerment (Stern, 2002).
Against this backdrop, with respect to the importance of
satisfaction, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the impacts of
unofﬁcial out-of-pocket payments (henceforth OOP) with respect
to satisfaction with primary and secondary schooling in the* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: habibov@yahoo.com, nnh@uwindsor.ca (N. Habibov),
cheun113@uwindsor.ca (A. Cheung).
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0738-0593/ 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articcountries of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia (henceforth
FSU). Many incidences of OOP in these countries can be qualiﬁed as
outright corruption (Heyneman, 2010, 2011). The classic deﬁnition
of corruption in education is deﬁned as ‘‘the abuse of authority for
personal as well as material gain’’ (Heyneman, 2004; p. 1). Reasons
for paying OOP can include paying education ofﬁcials to have
children admitted to a good school, unofﬁcial tutoring, and
payments for better grades and course work (Briller, 2007; OECD,
2004). Overall, OOP incidents are widespread in FSU countries. For
instance, in Russia, OECD (2004) reported that approximately half
the parents of schoolchildren paid OOP to get their children
accepted to a better school.
In contrast, in transitional countries, other types of OOP lie
beyond the classic deﬁnition of corruption since they do not
necessarily involve the private gain of public ofﬁcials. Examples of
such incidents involve purchasing school supplies, payments for
redecoration, refurbishment, and equipment and class materials
including textbooks (OECD, 2004). In these cases, the education
ofﬁcials may not receive any direct beneﬁts from the OOP. Rather,
OOP substitutes for funding from the state budget. The high
incidences of unofﬁcial OOP for these purposes are hardly
surprising given the chronic shortages of funds for education in
state budgets in FSU countries. In Tajikistan, for example, 75% of
schools work in two shifts to cope with the lack of school places,
and only 30% of students are able to obtain a full set of required
textbooks. Furthermore, teachers are paid very low salaries and
lack support in the classroom, thus forcing students, teachers,le under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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UNICEF, n.d.). Even in better-off Russia, 37% of public schools
require major repairs, while only 59% of schools have a proper
sewage system (OECD, 2004).
In addition, it is not often possible to distinguish between the
two above-described types of OOP. For example, a teacher may ask
parents to pay for class refurbishment, something that ofﬁcially
should be paid by the school budget. The teacher may use all
themoney collected for refurbishment. Alternatively, theymay use
only part of the money collected for refurbishment, and take
another part for themselves personally. Finally, the teacher may
take all collected money for themselves, knowing that the
refurbishment will be paid for by the school budget. Since it is
not possible to clearly distinguish between these different types of
OOP, in this paper we consider all OOP as one single phenomenon
that encompasses paying for educational services which should
have been provided for free (Diagne et al., 2012).
Two dominant perspectives are identiﬁed within the literature
with respect to OOP. The ﬁrst perspective is that in education, OOP
is a negative phenomenon. This perspective is in line with the
‘‘sand-the-wheel’’ hypothesis in the literature of political science
and economics, and is supported by international development
organizations such as the UN, IMF, and World Bank (Aidt, 2003,
2009). If students believe that success in education is the result
OOP rather than personal efforts, it undermines their efforts to gain
andmaintain human capital in an honest way instead of relying on
unofﬁcial payments (Heyneman, 2004, 2008; Transparency
International, 2013). It is not surprising then that paying OOP is
associatedwith lower learning outcomes (Azfar and Gurgur, 2008).
Moreover, OOP reinforces the existing inequality in society. The
children of wealthier parents receive a better-quality of education,
while those of poorer parents do not have the opportunity to
receive it (Transparency International, 2013; UNICEF, 2007). In
addition, paying OOP for services that should be provided for free
reduces citizens’ trust in the educational system, undermines
social justice, weakens social cohesion and solidarity in society,
and thus in turn hinders economic development and leads to
political instability (Heyneman, 2000, 2002, 2004). Consequently,
according to the ‘‘sand-the-wheel’’ perspective with respect to
OOP, we should expect to see a negative impact of OOP on
satisfaction with education.
The second perspective is that OOP are an important instrument
through which to alleviate distortions caused by the inefﬁciencies
of weak institutions. This perspective is in line with the ‘‘grease-
the-wheel’’ hypothesis in the political sciences and economics
literature (Dreher and Gassebner, 2013; Leff, 1964). Me´on and
Wheil (2010, p. 244) suggest that ‘‘the ‘the grease-the-wheels’
hypothesis states that, in a second best world, graft may act as a
trouble-saving device, thereby improving efﬁciency.’’ The positive
impacts of OOP in mitigating the inefﬁciencies of a centrally-
planned economy are well-documented in the literature (Holmes,
2000; Levy, 2007; Nye, 1967). Every parent wants to see their child
achieve success in getting the best possible educational outcomes
(Heyneman, 2004). Hence, it is possible to assume that parents
who pay OOP may be more satisﬁed if their children study under
better classroom and school conditions, receive higher grades,
obtain all required textbooks, and are accepted in better schools.
Indeed, the positive impact of OOP on satisfaction with pubic
services, including education, has been reported in many devel-
oped countries. Thus, Bratton (2007) has found that paying
unofﬁcial OOP is associated with increased satisfaction. A similar
conclusion was reached by Lavalle´e et al. (2008) who found that
the impact of payingOOPwas positivewhen the quality of received
public services had improved. Bratton (2007, p. 60) explains the
positive impact of OOP on satisfaction with public services by
stating that ‘‘paying [OOP] opens the door to services that areotherwise scarce and inaccessible.’’ As a result, according to the
‘‘grease-the-whee’’ perspective, we should expect to see a positive
impact of OOP on satisfaction with education.
The straightforward approach to estimating of the impact of
OOP on satisfaction with education is to regress satisfaction with
respect to OOP while controlling for the inﬂuence of covariates.
This approach can be implemented by a single-stage regression
(e.g. OLS and probit). This approach however, is problematic due to
the endogeneity that leads to reverse causality and omitted
variable biases. To address reverse causality and omitted variable
biases, we use instrumental variable models in addition to single-
stage models. Below, we will consider the details of reverse
causality and omitted variable biases, and the ways to address
them.
Recall that both the ‘‘sand-the-wheel’’ and ‘‘grease-the-wheel’’
perspectives postulate that paying OOP may affect satisfaction. At
the same time, it is reasonable to believe that satisfaction may
affect OOP inasmuch as higher satisfactionmay reduce the number
of OOP incidences. Indeed, public institutions that elicit higher
levels of satisfaction may encourage prosocial behaviors and
reduce unofﬁcial OOP by assuring citizens that all cases of OOPwill
be effectively prosecuted (Andriani and Sabatini, 2015; Irwin,
2009; Treisman, 2000; Uslaner, 2004). In addition, individuals who
are satisﬁed with the education services received are less likely to
be involved in or tolerate OOP (Ariely, 2011; Harding, 2013;Marien
andHooghe, 2011). Finally, higher levels of satisfactionwith public
services are typically associated with higher living standards, then
result in fewer incidents of criminal behavior, including corruption
(Kubbe, 2014). Thus, the provision of unofﬁcial OOP and the
resulting satisfaction creates a loop of causality where both
variables have simultaneous effects on each other. Such a loop of
causality leads to reverse causality in single-stage regression
models. The results of single-stage models are biased if reverse
causality is present. In contrast, instrumental variable models
highlight the true direction of the impact and adjust the results to
the presence of reverse causality (Baum, 2006; Cameron and
Trivedi, 2010).
Omitted variable bias is another serious problem that cannot
addressed by single-stage regression models. This problem arises
in the presence of some unobserved characteristics that can
simultaneously affect both outcome and impact variables. For
instance, transparency in schoolmanagementmay simultaneously
increase satisfaction and at the same time may reduce unofﬁcial
OOP (Lewis and Pattinasarany, 2009). Likewise, effectively
uncovering and prosecuting unofﬁcial OOP cases may simulta-
neously increase satisfaction while reducing the likelihood of OOP
payments. The single-stage regressions cannot account for omitted
variable problems that lead to biased results. In contrast,
instrumental variable models address the omitted variable bias
and adjust the results of estimations accordingly (Wooldridge,
2002).
To summarize, we evaluate the ‘‘sand-the-wheel’’ and ‘‘grease-
the-wheel’’ perspectives with respect to the impact of OOP on
satisfactionwith education. To adjust for possible endogeneity that
may lead to reverse causality and omitted variable biases, we
estimate both single-stage and instrumental variable regressions.
With this in mind, let us now turn to a discussion of the study’s
materials and methods.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Data
This study relies on the 2010 Life in Transition Survey
(henceforth the LITS) that was conducted jointly by the World
Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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include: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, the Ukraine and Uzbeki-
stan. Mongolia is also included in our sample although it was not
formally a part of the former Soviet Union. The advantage of the
LITS is that it provides high quality information about satisfaction
with primary and secondary education, incidents of OOPs in
schools, and the socio-economic characteristic of respondents.
Approximately 1000 respondents were selected randomly in each
country using a multistage clustered sampling method. In each
country, between 50 or 75 clusters were selected based on the
probability proportional to size technique. Within each cluster,
households were selected to be interviewed based on a systematic
random sampling technique. Finally, within households, the
respondent was selected for interview through the use of random
order number (Ipsos, 2011).
2.2. Outcome and impact variables
The outcome variable is citizen satisfactionwith the quality and
efﬁciency of public education (primary and secondary). The LITS
survey asked respondents to rate their satisfaction on an ordinal
scale from ‘‘very unsatisﬁed’’ to ‘‘very satisﬁed’’. Only those
respondents who had utilized public primary or secondary
education during the last 12 months before the date of the survey
were asked to answer this question.
The impact variable is having paidOOP inprimaryand secondary
schools. The LITS asked respondents whether they had paid an
unofﬁcial OOP or made a gift while utilizing a primary and/or
secondary school in the last 12 months. This variable is binary: if
respondents had paid an unofﬁcial OOP or made a gift, then the
paid OOP variable takes a value of 1; otherwise it takes a value of 0.
The difﬁculty inherent in analyzing outcome ordinal variables
and binomial predictors in the framework of instrumental
variables is that such a model has not yet been well worked out
in the literature and has not been well implemented in standard
software packages, especially in terms of the required tests for
instrumental variables (Lewis and Pattinasarany, 2009). Thus,
contemporary literature suggests two main ways to use the
instrumental variable approach when the outcome variable is
ordinal and the predictor is binomial. First, the ordinal outcome
variable can be treated as a continuous variable and a linear
instrument variable regression, and a so-called IV model, can be
then estimated (Kim et al., 2011). Second, the ordinal outcome
variable can be recoded into a binary variable ‘‘satisﬁedwith public
education’’ versus ‘‘not satisﬁed with public education," and an
instrument variable probit regression model, a so-called biprobit,
can then be estimated (Lewis and Pattinasarany, 2009). In this
paper, we use both suggested approaches to increase the
robustness of our ﬁndings. Therefore, our ﬁrst outcome variable
is ‘‘citizen satisfaction’’ as a continuous variable with a ﬁve-point
scale that has been taken directly from the LITS. In contrast, the
second outcome variable is binary, and takes a value of 1 if the
respondent is satisﬁed or very satisﬁed with public education,
otherwise it takes a value of 0. Descriptive statistics for all
discussed variables are reported in Table 1.
The ﬁrst graph in Fig. 1 illustrates the relationship between
satisfaction and OOP and gifts, using satisfaction as a continuous
variable. The graph plots average satisfaction per country with the
proportion of people who reported paying unofﬁcial OOP in
primary and secondary schools. As observed, higher incidents of
such payments correlated with lower satisfaction. This visual
observation is empirically supported by the Pearson correlation
(r = 0.79).
The second graph in Fig. 1 depicts the relationship between
satisfaction and unofﬁcial OOP and gifts using satisfaction as abinary variable. The graph plots the proportion of satisﬁed
respondents per country with the proportion of people who
reported paying unofﬁcial OOP and gifts in primary and secondary
schools in the countries of the FSU. Again, visual observation
demonstrates that higher numbers of incidents of such payments
are correlated with lower levels of satisfaction. This visual
observation is conﬁrmed by the Pearson correlation (r = 0.60).
These ﬁndings provide us with an initial understanding of the
association between higher OOP and lower satisfaction with
education.
2.3. Analytic strategy
We begin by estimating classic single-stage OLS and binary
probit models. Next, we estimate IV and biprobit. Hence, linear
single-stage OLS is compared with an IV, while probit is
compared with biprobit. Conceptually, the IV model consists of
two regression models  the so-called ﬁrst and the main stages,
although popular software packages typically derive the results
in a single step. In the ﬁrst stage, the impact variable, unofﬁcial
OOP, is regressed on the instrument and all covariates using OLS.
In the main stage, the outcome variable, satisfaction with
primary and secondary education is regressed on the predicted
value of unofﬁcial OOP from the ﬁrst stage equation and all
covariates. The IV models are estimated using the ivregress
command in Stata 13. Similar to the IV approach, the biprobit
requires two binomial probit equations. The ﬁrst one is used to
regress the impact variable on the instrument and all covariates,
while the second one is used to regress the outcome on the
impact variable and covariates. Biprobit ﬁts both probit
equations simultaneously using amaximum-likelihood approach
to ﬁnd the joint probability of being satisﬁed with education and
having paid unofﬁcial OOP. Biprobit is estimated using the
biprobit command in Stata 13.
The estimation of IV and biprobit models requires instruments
that are strongly correlated with the impact variable and should
not have a direct effect on the outcome variable other than through
the impact variable. Finding such a variable is a difﬁcult task, but
we beneﬁtted from the feature of the LITS that asked a follow-up
question regarding whether respondents had paid OOP because
they had been asked to directly by educational ofﬁcials. This
question was asked only from those respondents who had
suggested that they had paid OOP. Alternative reasons for paying
OOP indicate the initiation of OOP by the respondent, and this
could have occurred because: the respondent was not asked, but
had made a gratitude payment; the respondent was not asked
but knew that OOP had been expected; the respondent paid to get
what they wanted in a better and more efﬁcient fashion.
Consequently, we use the binomial variable ‘‘Asked to pay
unofﬁcial OOP’’ that indicates whether or not OOP was paid
because educational ofﬁcials had directly asked the respondent to
pay it as the instrument in this study. The link between the
instrument, the predictor, and the outcome is illustrated graphi-
cally in Fig. 2. As shown, the instrument ‘‘Asked to pay unofﬁcial
OOP’’ is not related to satisfaction other than through the impact
variable, while the instrument ‘‘Asked to pay unofﬁcial OOP’’ is
strongly correlated with the impact variable.
Let us begin with the ﬁrst postulate that the instrument, ‘‘Asked
to pay unofﬁcial OOP," is not related to satisfaction other than
through the impact variable. On the one hand, satisfaction is
unlikely to inﬂuence the decision to ask for OOP, since the decision
to ask for an OOP does not originate with the respondent but with
the educational ofﬁcials (Clausen et al., 2011). It is implausible that
the educational ofﬁcials knew about of respondent’s level of
satisfaction before asking them to pay unofﬁcial OOP. It is even less
implausible that the educational ofﬁcials made a decision about
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics.
Variable Deﬁnition Average % Std. dev. Min Max
Outcome variables
Satisfaction with primary
and secondary 1
Satisfaction with primary and secondary school measured on
an ordinal scale from 1= ‘‘very unsatisﬁed’’ to 5= ‘‘very
satisﬁed’’. This variable serves as an outcome variable in
estimations by linear single-stage and instrumental variable
regressions—OLS and IV, respectively.
3.578 0.925 1 5
Satisfaction with primary
and secondary 2
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if respondent is satisﬁed
with primary and secondary school, otherwise it takes a value
of 0. This variable serves as an outcome variable in estimations
by binomial single-stage and instrumental variable
regressions—probit and bivariate probit, respectively.
69% 0.005 0 1
Service delivery
Quality of education A summative index indicating the number of problems
encountered while interacting with primary and secondary
schools in last 12 months. The higher value of the index
indicates less problems and, hence, higher quality.
0.852 1.108 0 5
Socio-demographics
Age Age of respondents in years 38.94 12.85 18 90
Female This binary variable that takes value of 1 if a respondent is
female, otherwise it takes value of 0.
63% 0.006 0 1
University This binary variable that takes a value of 1 if a respondent
received university education, otherwise it takes value of 0.
18% 0.005 0 1
Middle wealth This is a binary variable for the household’s social status. It
takes value of 1 if a household is a middle wealth household,
otherwise it takes value of 0.
34% 0.006 0 1
Wealthiest This binary takes value of 1 if a household is a wealthiest
household, otherwise it takes a value of 0.
37% 0.006 0 1
Country dummies Country-level ﬁxed effects 0 1
Cluster dummies Cluster-level ﬁxed effects 0 1
Impact variable
Paid OOP This binary variable takes value of 1 if a respondent paid an
unofﬁcial out-of-pocket payment or made a gift while
interacting with public school ofﬁcials during last 12 months;
otherwise it takes a value of 0.
17% 0.004 0 1
Instrument
Asked to pay This binary variable that takes a value of 1 if a respondent was
asked to pay an unofﬁcial out-of-pocket payment or made a
gift while interactingwith public school ofﬁcials during the last
12 months. It takes value of 0 if a respondent paid for other
reasons or did not pay OOP at all.
4.60% 0.002 0 1
[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. Household satisfaction regarding primary education services versus proportion of people who paid OOP.
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[(Fig._2)TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. Illustration of the relationship of the instrument, the predictor, and the outcome variables.
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respondent’s level of satisfaction.
On the other hand, the decision to ask for an OOP is also
unlikely to affect satisfaction directly. As demonstrated by a solid
line in Fig. 2, all respondents (31%)whohad been asked to payOOP
by the educational ofﬁcials actually did it. Hence, the effect of
paying OOP as a result of a request from educational ofﬁcials is
fully captured by the predictor. As shown by the dotted lines, this
effect goes from the instrument to the predictor (answer ‘‘Yes’’)
and then to the outcome variable ‘‘Satisfaction.’’ If the respondent
had been asked, but refused to pay, then no incident of OOPwould
have been recorded. The possible change in satisfaction due to
being asked to pay OOP, but refusing to do so is captured by the
predictor and includedwithin the 84% of respondentswho did not
pay OOP (answer ‘‘No’’).
To empirically support the above-discussed arguments about
the lack of a strong correlation between the instrument and the
outcome variable, we conducted a test on correlation between
‘‘Asked to pay unofﬁcial OOP’’ and ‘‘Satisfaction.’’ The result of the
test (r = 0.17) suggests that the correlation is negligible and that
the instrument is not directly related to the outcome variable
(Mukaka, 2012). Thus, both theoretical reasoning and the empirical
test suggest that the instrument is not correlated with the
outcome, other than through the impact variable.
Let us continue with the second postulate that the instrument,
‘‘Asked to pay unofﬁcial OOP’’ is strongly correlated with the
impact variable. To empirically test this assumption, we use
several tests, as reported in Table 2. First, as we expected, our
instrument is positively and strongly correlated with the
predictor, paying OOP, in the ﬁrst stage regressions in all models.
Second, a signiﬁcant value for the estimated robust F statistics is
always greater than 10, indicating that our instrument is valid
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). Third, the minimum eigenvalue
statistics are larger than Stock and Yogo’s critical value (Stock
and Yogo, 2005), conﬁrming the argument that our instrument is
not weakly correlated with the predcitor. Although these tests
are not especially designed to test non-linear models such us
biprobit, the estimation of these tests is still highly recom-
mended (Nichols, 2007).
Finally, we test the assumption that instrumental variable
models should be preferred over single-stage regressions. For IV,
we perform an endogeneity test robust score Chi-sq and robust
regression F statistics (Wooldridge, 1995). A signiﬁcant result for
these tests indicates that OLS estimation is biased and that IV
should be estimated instead. For biprobit, we perform the Wald
test of endogeneity. A signiﬁcant result of the test signals that
single-stage probit estimation is biased, and thus biprobit should
be estimated instead (Knapp and Seaks, 1998).
2.4. Covariates
First of all, we control for the quality of education. LITS asked a
battery of ﬁve questions related to the problems that respondents
might have encountered during past 12 months: (1) ‘‘No textbooksor other supplies that should be provided free of charge’’, (2) ‘‘Poor
teaching’’, (3) ‘‘Frequent and unjustiﬁed absence of teachers’’, (4)
‘‘Overcrowded classrooms’’, (5) ‘‘Facilities in poor condition’’.
Only binomial responses are allowed (the problem exists = 1,
otherwise = 0). Using these binomial responses, we created a
summative index of educational quality that varies from 0 to
5. The higher value of the index indicates less of a problem and,
hence, higher quality.
We use the university education of the respondents and the
wealth status of their households as controls for socio-economic
status. The impact of socio-economic status cannot be known in
advance (Lewis and Pattinasarany, 2009). On the one hand, higher
socio-economic status may be associated with higher levels of
satisfaction if individuals with higher education and more wealth
have access to better education delivery and outcomes, and
therefore are more satisﬁed. On the other hand, socio-economic
status may be associated with lower levels of satisfaction if
individuals with higher education and more wealth have higher
expectations of education delivery and outcomes, which then
exceed actual performance.
We also control for the inﬂuence of socio-demographic
characteristics by the gender and age of the respondent (Harmel
and Yeh, 2011; Lewis and Pattinasarany, 2009). Finally, we include
dummy variables for countries and clusters to capture unobserved
characteristics at the country and cluster level thatmay potentially
affect the results of our estimations.
3. Results
The results of a single stage linear OLS and a single-stage
biprobit that do not address endogeneity are reported in
Table 2. The OLS coefﬁcients are reported in the ﬁrst column of
the table, while the marginal effects of probit are reported in the
second column. OOP has a signiﬁcant and negative impact on
satisfaction in both models. As shown by the OLS coefﬁcients,
paying OOP leads to a reduction in satisfaction by a factor of0.38.
Likewise, as shown by the probit marginal effects, OOP reduces
satisfaction by by 17 percentage points. Among covariates, OLS
suggests that an increase in educational quality is associated with
an increase in satisfaction by a factor of 0.22. Equally, the IV
regression suggests that an increase in educational quality is
associated with an increase in satisfaction by percentage points.
All other covariates are not signiﬁcant.
The results of the main stage of IV and biprobit models are
reported in the last two columns of Panel A in Table 2, while the
ﬁrst stages of the models are reported in Panel B. Again, OOP leads
to a negative and signiﬁcant impact on satisfaction. After having
addressed endogeneity, the IV model suggests that OOP leads to a
reduction in satisfaction by a factor of 0.98. In the same way,
the biprobit model suggests that OOP reduces satisfaction by
percentage points, after having addressed endogeneity.
Much like the single stage model, the instrumental variable
model suggests that the only covariate whose impact is signiﬁcant
is educational quality. Thus, IV indicates that an increase in
Table 2
Results of regression analysis.
Single-stage models Instrumental variable models
OLS Probit IV Biprobit
Regression coefﬁcients Marginal effects Regression coefﬁcients Marginal effects
Panel A: Results of main models
Paid OOP 0.388*** 0.175*** 0.987*** 0.287***
(0.041) (0.020) (0.102) (0.028)
Quality of education 0.224*** 0.109*** 0.176*** 0.078***
(0.017) (0.008) (0.018) (0.007)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Women 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.030) (0.017) (0.031) (0.014)
University 0.028 0.009 0.010 0.003
(0.036) (0.020) (0.037) (0.017)
Middle wealth households 0.053 0.023 0.055 0.020
(0.035) (0.021) (0.036) (0.017)
Wealthiest households 0.026 0.016 0.016 0.011
(0.035) (0.021) (0.036) (0.017)
Country dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3598 3576 3598 3598
F statistics 9.12***
Wald chi2 611.07*** 850.9*** 7008.92***
First-stage regression summary statistics
Robust F 2036.37***
Minimum eigenvalue
statistic
892.07***
Stock and Yogo’s critical
value
16.38
Tests of endogeneity
Robust score Chi2 43.60***
Robust regression F 46.18***
Wald test of rho =0
Chi2 statistic 24.49***
Panel B: Result of ﬁrst-stage of 2SLS and bivariate probit
Ask to pay 0.689*** 2.092***
(0.015) (0.076)
Quality of education 0.055*** 0.044***
(0.007) (0.005)
Age 0.001* 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Women 0.001 0.001
(0.012) (0.012)
University 0.032* 0.028*
(0.015) (0.014)
Middle wealth households 0.009 0.006
(0.015) (0.015)
Wealthiest households 0.017 0.019
(0.015) (0.014)
Country dummies included Yes Yes
Cluster dummies included Yes Yes
Number of observations 3598
F statistics 120.85***
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3
Simulated IV and biprobit results.
IV Biprobit
Everyone paid OOP 2.791 0.433
[2.781, 2.799] [0.424, 0.435]
No one paid OOP 3.778 0.772
[3.768, 3.787] [0.766, 0.775]
Note: 95% conﬁdence interval is given in bracket.
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a factor of 0.17, while bivariate probit indicates that an increase in
educational quality is associatedwith an increase in satisfaction by
7% points. Other covariates are not signiﬁcant.
By comparing the results of the single-stage and IV models, we
can conclude that the results of single-stage models under-
estimated the impact of OOP on education. Thus, the impact of OOP
estimated by IV is 2.5 times larger than the impact estimated by
Table 4
Results of interaction models.
OLS IV
Panel A: Results of main stage
Paid OOP 3.408*** 3.393***
(0.042) (0.051)
Paid OOPquality of education (interaction term) 0.949*** 0.957***
(0.009) (0.013)
Quality of education 0.142*** 0.144***
(0.014) (0.014)
Age 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Women 0.019 0.019
(0.024) (0.023)
University 0.018 0.019
(0.029) (0.029)
Middle wealth households 0.001 0.000
(0.028) (0.027)
Wealthiest households 0.009 0.008
(0.028) (0.027)
Country dummies included Yes Yes
Community dummies included Yes Yes
Number of observations Yes Yes
Wald chi2 3598
First-stage regression summary statistics 15016.31***
Robust F for paid OOP in primary and secondary school 1030.72***
Robust F for paid OOP in primary and secondary school
quality of education
1389.64***
Minimum eigenvalue statistic 348.689
Stock and Yogo’s critical value 7.03
Tests of endogeneity
Robust score Chi2 2.30
Robust regression F 1.12
Panel B: Result of ﬁrst-stage of 2SLS (paid OOP in primary and secondary school)
Ask to pay 0.998***
(0.084)
Ask to payquality of education 1.014***
(0.026)
Quality of education 0.128***
(0.021)
Age 0.004*
(0.002)
Women 0.031
(0.044)
University 0.084
(0.052)
Middle wealth households 0.021
(0.053)
Wealthiest households 0.036
(0.053)
Country dummies included Yes
Cluster dummies included Yes
Number of observations 3598
F statistics 111.32***
Panel C: Result of ﬁrst-stage of 2SLS (paid OPP in primary and secondary schoolquality of education)
Asked to pay 0.653***
(0.028)
Asked to payquality of education 0.014
(0.008)
Quality of education 0.056***
(0.007)
Age 0.001*
(0.000)
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OLS IV
Women 0.001
(0.012)
University 0.032*
(0.015)
Middle wealth households 0.009
(0.015)
Wealthiest households 0.017
(0.015)
Country dummies included Yes
Cluster dummies included Yes
Number of observations 3598
F statistics 120.37***
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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1.6 times larger than the impact estimated by single-stage probit.
An alternative way to evaluate the impact of OOP is to predict
the average satisfaction with education for every individual in the
sample depending on their levels of OOP through a simulation
based on the results IV and biprobit results. The results of the
simulations for IV are reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 3. If
every respondent had paid OOP, then the average level of
satisfaction with education would drop to 2.79. Conversely, if no
respondent had paid OOP, then the average satisfaction of with the
education service would exceed 3.77. The results of the simula-
tions for biprobit are reported in the last column of Table 3 and
reveal the same pattern. If every respondent had paid OOP, then
the probability of their being satisﬁed would decline to 43% points.
In contrast, if no respondent had paid OOP, then the probability of
being satisﬁed would surpass 77% points.
The ﬁnal step in our analysis is to estimate the OLS and IV
models with the interaction terms ‘‘paid OOP  quality of
education ". The results are reported in the Panel A of
Table 4. In both models, increases in paid for OOP signiﬁcantly
weaken satisfaction with the factors by 3.40 and 3.39
respectively, while improvement in quality has an opposite impact
with a factor of 0.14.
The interaction term ‘paid OOP  quality of education’ has a
positive impact with respect to both models by signiﬁcantly
strengthening satisfaction by the factors of 0.94 and 0.95. It must
be highlighted that the tests for endogeneity failed to conﬁrm that
IV should be preferred over the OLS. Hence, OLS results should be
used instead of IV results. To facilitate the interpretation of the
marginal effects of the interaction terms, we plot the OLS results of
the impact of paid OOP against the quality of education in Fig. 3, as
recommended by Brambor et al. (2006).[(Fig._3)TD$FIG]
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Fig. 3. Impact of OOP versus quality of education.As illustrated by the trend in Fig. 3, the negative impact of OOP
weakens, and eventually becomes positive. Therefore, the negative
impact of OOP is lower in environments where the quality of
education is higher. In contrast, when quality of education is low,
then the negative impact of OOP increases considerably.
Since we estimated a model with interaction terms, we have
two ﬁrst-stages. The ﬁrst stage ‘‘paid OOP in primary and
secondary school’’ is reported in Panel B of Table 4, while the
ﬁrst stage that corresponds to the ‘‘paid OOP in primary and
secondary school  quality of education’’ is reported in Panel C.
4. Limitations
Several key limitations should also be highlighted. First, we
cannot distinguish between outright corruption and OOP taken to
improve education (e.g. class refurbishment) due to the limitations
of the data. Likewise, we cannot distinguish between recipients of
OOP (e.g. teachers versus principals). Second, OOP is viewed only
from the perspective of users, and the opinions of teachers,
students, educational managers, and politicians cannot not be
taken into account. Similarly, the data allows us to focus only on
petty corruption, rather than on large scale educational OOP. Third,
the results of the instrumental variable estimations are as good as
the instrument is. Although theoretical reasoning and empirical
tests suggest that the instrument is not directly correlatedwith the
outcome, such a direct effect cannot be completely ruled out.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we explore the ‘‘sand-the-wheel’’ and ‘‘grease-
the-wheel’’ perspectives regarding the impact of OOP on citizens’
satisfaction with primary and secondary education in Post-Soviet
countries.We apply single stage and IVmodels on a cross-sectional
sample of a comparative survey conducted in 11 countries of the
former Soviet Union and Mongolia.
The results of single stage linear and probit models support the
‘‘sand-the-wheel’’ perspective and reject the ‘‘grease-the-wheel’’
perspective. OOP has a signiﬁcant negative impact on citizens’
satisfaction with primary and secondary education in all single-
stage models. We use the instrumental variable technique to
address endogeneity biases that encompass reverse causality and
the omitted variable problem. The results of IV and biprobit
estimations indicate that the impact of OOP on satisfaction
remains signiﬁcant and negative after addressing endogeneity.
These ﬁndings conﬁrm support for the ‘‘sand-the-wheel’’ perspec-
tive over the ‘‘grease-the-wheel’’ perspective. These ﬁndings also
suggest that more efforts need to be made to reduce corruption in
FSU countries. One possible way to reduce the OOP in education
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schools (Heyneman, 2004). Another would be to increase
transparency within school management, for instance, through
conducting and analysing regular surveys on OOP in education
(Heyneman, 2008). In addition, governments should increase
educational budgets. Increased budgets could help reduce
teachers’ dependency on OOP and lessen the need for OOP
for refurbishment, equipment, textbooks, class materials etc.
(Heyneman, 2004).
At the same time, the interaction model demonstrates that the
negative impact of OOP declines as quality of education is
improves. Equally, when the quality of education deteriorates,
then the negative impact of OOP strengthens considerably. This
result appears to provide some support for the ‘‘grease-the-wheel’’
perspective. This result is also in line with the previous ﬁndings of
Bratton (2007) and Lavalle´e et al. (2008). However, even in the
interaction model, the impact of OOP on satisfaction with
education remains negative. This ﬁnding suggests that the support
for the ‘‘grease-the-wheel’’ perspective is rather weak when
compared to the support for the ‘‘sand-the-wheel’’ perspective.
From a methodological standpoint, we found that single stage
models (i.e. OLS and probit) considerably underestimate the true
impact of corruption on satisfaction. The underestimation caused
by endogeneity leads to reverse causality and omitted variable
problems. Therefore, the results of cross-sectional studies that use
single stage models to estimate the impact of corruption on
satisfaction without addressing endogeneity may be misleading in
terms of showing the true magnitude of the negative impacts of
corruption on satisfaction with education. The actual magnitude
of the OPP effect on satisfaction is likely to be higher than that
which can be found without addressing endogeneity.
The results of this study provide impetus for future research in
three main directions. First, regional and country effects of
corruption could be studied in a more in-depth manner. It is
conceivable to assume that regional and country particularities
may play important roles in determining the impact of unofﬁcial
OOP on satisfactionwith education. Second, it would be instructive
to evaluate the characteristics related to the propensity of being a
victim of OOP. Third, longitudinal studies may add value by
focusing on the trend rather than on a snapshot of the impact of
OOP on satisfaction.
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